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Viral factors in influenza
pandemic risk assessment
Abstract The threat of an influenza A virus pandemic stems from continual virus spillovers from
reservoir species, a tiny fraction of which spark sustained transmission in humans. To date, no
pandemic emergence of a new influenza strain has been preceded by detection of a closely related
precursor in an animal or human. Nonetheless, influenza surveillance efforts are expanding,
prompting a need for tools to assess the pandemic risk posed by a detected virus. The goal would be
to use genetic sequence and/or biological assays of viral traits to identify those non-human influenza
viruses with the greatest risk of evolving into pandemic threats, and/or to understand drivers of such
evolution, to prioritize pandemic prevention or response measures. We describe such efforts, identify
progress and ongoing challenges, and discuss three specific traits of influenza viruses (hemagglutinin
receptor binding specificity, hemagglutinin pH of activation, and polymerase complex efficiency) that
contribute to pandemic risk.
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Introduction
Aquatic birds are the main reservoir of influenza
A viruses in nature (Krauss and Webster, 2010).
Influenza viruses from aquatic birds sporadically
enter terrestrial bird and mammalian host popu-
lations and achieve sustained circulation in these
new hosts (Vandegrift et al., 2010), sometimes
after reassortment with influenza viruses already
circulating in the new host (Webster et al.,
1992). Adaptation of viruses from aquatic birds
to mammals involves a change in tissue tropism
from intestinal to respiratory epithelia
(Hinshaw et al., 1979; He´naux and Samuel,
2015).
Multiple influenza A subtypes—defined by
the patterns of antibody recognition of two sur-
face proteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuramin-
idase (NA)—circulate in avian species and swine
at any given time. Among these, a number are
known to cause sporadic zoonotic infections in
humans (Peiris, 2009). More than one thousand
human infections with avian influenza viruses
were detected in the last decade, for example
H5N1 and H7N9 (Qin et al., 2015) as well as
swine influenza viruses, e.g. an H3N2 variant
that spilled over into humans attending agricul-
tural shows in the early 2010s, H3N2v
(Jhung et al., 2013). In addition, zoonotic infec-
tions with other viruses from poultry or wild
birds have occurred, including for example
H7N7 (Fouchier et al., 2004), H10N8
(Wohlbold et al., 2015), H6N1 (Wei et al.,
2013), H9N2 (Butt et al., 2005), and H5N6
(Yang et al., 2015); for more examples and a
fuller discussion see (Short et al., 2015). The
severity of zoonotic influenza A infections ranges
from clinically inapparent (Gomaa et al., 2015;
To et al., 2016) to fatal (de Jong et al., 2006;
Gao et al., 2013).
Although secondary transmission can occur
following some of these spillover events
(Kucharski et al., 2014), only a very small pro-
portion of them—four in the last hundred years,
which seems to be close to the historical aver-
age (Patterson, 1986)—led to sustained per-
son-to-person transmission with global spread
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(Box 1). There are 18 known HA types and 11
known NA types (Tong et al., 2013), which
could theoretically be found in any combination.
So far, sustained spread in humans has been lim-
ited to the H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 subtypes
(Kuiken et al., 2006), though it is possible that
other subtypes circulated prior to 1918, the year
of the first pandemic from which viruses are
available for study (Worobey et al., 2014). Mul-
tiple virus–host interactions are necessary for
replication and onward transmission; the differ-
ences in the genetic requirements to accomplish
each of these interactions in humans versus
other animals provide a barrier to sustained
transmission following spillover (Russell et al.,
2014).
Experiments in ferrets have been used to
measure viral transmissibility via respiratory
droplets (in this review we use this term to refer
to any transmission through the air between fer-
rets that are not in direct or indirect physical
contact). Droplet transmission in ferrets is a use-
ful, albeit imperfect, correlate of the potential of
influenza strains to transmit efficiently in human
populations (Buhnerkempe et al., 2015). For
this reason, some have argued that there is a
Box 1. Steps in pandemic emergence.
For an avian-adapted strain of influenza A to become a pandemic strain, several events are
required:
1. The avian-adapted strain must become sufficiently widespread in wild or domestic birds,
swine or other reservoir species to expose at least one human to infection.
2. One or more humans must acquire infection from the reservoir species.
3. The infection must replicate sufficiently in a zoonotic case to produce infectious virus in
respiratory or other secretions.
4. The infection must be transmitted to additional humans, avoiding an "early" termination
of the transmission chain due to chance. Such early termination is a significant risk given
the relatively low infectiousness of influenza and the moderate degree of overdispersion
in the number of secondary cases infected by each case, both of which contribute to the
probability that a transmission chain will terminate by chance (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2005;
Lipsitch et al., 2003). It must also avoid extinction due to deliberate control efforts put
in place by public health authorities (Ferguson et al., 2006; Merler et al., 2013).
5. Finally, the infection must spread beyond the local area to infect members of distant
populations, a process accelerated by modern global travel (Cooper et al., 2006). This
step and the one before are enhanced if the level of population susceptibility is high, as
occurs when the surface proteins of the new strain are dissimilar to those on any cur-
rently or recently circulating human influenza A strains.
We know from serologic studies and human infections that several different influenza A viruses
have achieved steps 1 and 2 at any given time (Gomaa et al., 2015; To et al., 2016). Steps 3
and/or 4 appear to be the rare, rate-limiting steps; that is, the conditional probability of achiev-
ing step 3 and 4 given the previous steps is low, so that sustained human-to-human transmission
of a novel strain occurs a few times per century while zoonotic infections must occur thousands
or more times per year. No case is known in which an influenza A strain has reached stage 4 but
failed to reach stage 5, although it may have happened undetected.
The appearance – by mutation or reassortment – and selection of genetic changes that encode
human-adaptive viral traits may be seen as a process that can accelerate or increase the proba-
bility of one or more of these steps (though there is no guarantee that a given change that
enhances one of these steps will enhance all of them. This is why the detection of phenotypes
associated with human adaptation in avian or zoonotic isolates of novel influenza A viruses is
thought to correlate with increased risk of pandemic emergence. As we describe throughout
the paper, the process of human adaptation need not be complete to initiate a pandemic, so it
may continue to occur at various stages throughout this progression.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.002
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general phenotype of ’transmissibility by respira-
tory droplets in mammals’ such that experiments
to select for such transmission in droplets in fer-
rets are important models of the process of
adaptation to human transmission (Imai et al.,
2012; Herfst et al., 2012). This view is not uni-
versally shared (Palese and Wang, 2012). Start-
ing from an zoonotic highly pathogenic avian
influenza isolate from a human case of infection
(or a reassortant of the HA from a different zoo-
notic H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza
isolate, with the other segments from the 2009
pandemic H1N1 strain), it was shown that certain
specific traits that had been previously associ-
ated with mammalian host adaptation were
required to achieve respiratory droplet transmis-
sion. These ferret-transmission phenotypes in
turn were associated with certain genetic
changes relative to the original avian viruses
(Imai et al., 2012; Herfst et al., 2012;
Linster et al., 2014). These specific changes
occur both in HA and in polymerase-complex
proteins.
The rationale for these experiments was
that, because the ferret model recapitulates
many features of human infection, changes
identified in adaptation to ferret transmission
would also be important for adaptation to sus-
tained transmission in humans (Davis et al.,
2014; Schultz-Cherry et al., 2014), though
this can never be known with certainty
(Palese and Wang, 2012). Notably, viruses iso-
lated from humans who were infected by con-
tact with birds show some of these changes
(Russell et al., 2012; Bi et al., 2015), particu-
larly the change at amino acid 627 of the PB2
gene (Jonges et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014;
Fonville et al., 2013), which often affects poly-
merase complex efficiency (see below). This
indicates that even the first generation of
human infection from nonhuman hosts can initi-
ate a process of host adaptation. It also indi-
cates that not all the human-adaptive changes
must be in place in the avian reservoir to initi-
ate this process. Some human infections,
including some zoonotic cases (de Jong et al.,
2006; Chen et al., 2014, 2006; Sha et al.,
2016) and some cases early in a pandemic
(Rogers and D’Souza, 1989; Connor et al.,
1994; Stevens et al., 2006; Glaser et al.,
2005; Pappas et al., 2010), involve viruses
that are not yet fully human-adapted (see
below and Tables 2–4). The interpretation of
some of these isolates is complicated by uncer-
tainty about whether they were passaged in
hen’s eggs at some point in their history.
Certain types of countermeasures against an
influenza pandemic are effective only against
one lineage of viruses – for example, creating
stockpiles or seed stocks of vaccines against a
particular subtype, or culling poultry infected
with that subtype. It is not currently feasible to
invest in such countermeasures against all
viruses circulating in avian or other reservoirs,
or even against all those causing known zoo-
notic cases. Therefore, there would be value in
an accurate system to assess the relative pan-
demic risks posed by each virus and prioritize
them for the development of such strain-spe-
cific countermeasures, while directing fewer
resources to strains of lower concern
(Kaplan et al., 2016). This consideration has
motivated calls for comprehensive analysis of all
available data to assess the threat to public
health posed by these strains. One response is
the CDC’s Influenza Risk Assessment Tool
(IRAT) (Trock et al., 2015), which incorporates
elements including properties of the virus, field
and epidemiological findings, and attributes of
the human population to provide a framework
to differentiate among novel influenza viruses
thought to possess pandemic potential. Such
risk assessments can help focus pandemic pre-
vention and response efforts on the viruses
thought to pose the highest risk of pandemic
spread (Davis et al., 2014), in the most worri-
some cases providing a rationale for costly
measures such as poultry culling or vaccine
seed stock development, or even stockpiling of
large quantities of vaccine. A guiding question
of this article is to examine the degree to which
it is justified to rely on measurements and pre-
dictions of viral genetic and phenotypic traits in
prioritizing responses to particular viral sub-
types and within-subtype lineages.
There are several hurdles to evaluating the
accuracy of such predictions (Russell et al.,
2014). Factors limiting our ability to identify
high-risk viruses and predict the risk they pose
include:
. limited surveillance of nonhuman influenza
viruses, such that high-risk viruses may not
be detected and hence cannot be
assessed (Butler, 2012). Limitations
include both the number, geographic and
species diversity of hosts sampled, and the
difficulty in sampling all genetic variants
present in a given infection (Poon et al.,
2016; Varble et al., 2014);
. failure to fully characterize some viruses
that are detected (Hoye et al., 2010);
Lipsitch et al. eLife 2016;5:e18491. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491 3 of 38
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. imperfect public health systems lacking
capacity to detect zoonotic infections pre-
senting in patients (Sanicas et al., 2014;
Simonsen et al., 2013);
. epistasis and other complexities that pre-
vent straightforward prediction of viral
traits from genotype (Russell et al., 2014;
Kryazhimskiy et al., 2011; Gong and
Bloom, 2014; Bloom et al., 2010;
Wu et al., 2016; Raman et al., 2014;
Tharakaraman et al., 2013; Gong et al.,
2013);
. technological limitations in molecular
modeling and phenotypic assays that limit
confidence in predicting and measuring
viral traits (Russell, 2014);
. uncertainties about the taxonomic level at
which risk predictions should be made
(Box 2);
. practical, ethical and cost limitations of
animal transmission experiments, as well
as some exceptions to the correlation
between human transmissibility and drop-
let transmissibility in nonhuman animal
models (Buhnerkempe et al., 2015);
. lack of data on immediate animal precur-
sors of viruses that caused previous
pandemics;
. multiple scales at which viral strains com-
pete and hence experience selection (i.e.
replication within hosts, transmission
between hosts). Evolutionary theory for
such multi-scale selection is incomplete.
Viral fitness components are rarely mea-
sured at both scales for the same strain
and are imperfectly correlated across
scales (Gog et al., 2015; Park et al.,
2013; Beauchemin and Handel, 2011);
. the role of stochastic events in the ecology
and evolution of influenza viruses during
and after host-switching to humans
(Gog et al., 2015; Lloyd-Smith et al.,
2015), including the potential for transmis-
sion bottlenecks to either promote or
inhibit emergence of human-adapted
viruses (Varble et al., 2014; Moncla et al.,
2016; Wilker et al., 2013; Zaraket et al.,
2015).
These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact
that influenza pandemics are rare events, and
that risk assessments are not yet made with
enough quantitative precision to formally evalu-
ate their practical application. Even perfect infor-
mation about the viral determinants of
pandemic risk might only be enough to distin-
guish between strains with a low risk of causing
a pandemic (say, 0.1% per year) and those with
an extremely low risk (say, less than 0.01% per
year), with unpredictable ecological or
evolutionary contingencies determining which of
these low-probability events will actually occur.
One such contingency is that an avian influenza
virus could acquire one or more of the determi-
nants of pandemic potential by reassorting with
a human seasonal influenza virus.
With only one pandemic every few decades,
the data set for testing the prediction of such
rare events is inadequate, a problem that chal-
lenges predictions in many fields beyond infec-
tious diseases (King and Zeng, 2001;
Hansson, 2006). Evolutionary events in which a
strain increases human-to-human transmissibility,
but not enough to spark a pandemic, are
extremely hard to observe, but if we could do so
it would increase our ability to characterize the
process of adaptation (Kucharski et al., 2015).
Despite these challenges, there has been tre-
mendous interest and investment in making and
using such predictions, and a number of new
ideas to improve predictions are in various
stages of development (Box 3). Building on the
findings of a previous workshop (Russell et al.,
2014), we considered in detail the present state
of knowledge concerning three phenotypic
traits: HA receptor binding specificity, and HA
pH of activation, and polymerase complex activ-
ity, (Figure 1). These were chosen from a longer
list of candidate traits (Table 1) because they
span the viral life cycle (Figure 1) and their role
in host adaptation has been extensively studied.
All three are believed to be required for an influ-
enza virus to cause a pandemic; consistent with
this assumption, all three traits have been pres-
ent to some degree in the earliest viruses iso-
lated in pandemics since the 20th century,
though some have been enhanced by subse-
quent evolution during seasonal transmission in
humans. Moreover, for each of these three traits,
viruses isolated from avian hosts typically do not
show the mammalian-adapted phenotype,
reflecting divergent selection pressures in the
two classes of hosts (Tables 2, 3, and 4). All
three traits changed in the adaptation of zoo-
notic H5 influenza viruses to droplet transmission
in ferrets (Imai et al., 2012; Linster et al.,
2014). We emphasize that each of these traits is
quantitative, and that human-adaptation is not a
threshold criterion but a continuum; in this
review when we speak of human adaptation we
mean a tendency to be better adapted to
humans, rather than an absolute yes-or-no
property.
This review starts with a summary of our
knowledge about the role of each of the three
Lipsitch et al. eLife 2016;5:e18491. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491 4 of 38
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functional traits in conferring pandemic potential
on a virus strain. Following these case studies,
we draw some generalizations about the pros-
pects of predicting pandemic risk from virus
genotype or from assays of particular viral traits.
For each trait we present a table showing the
degree to which the sequence changes or phe-
notypic properties associated with avian or
human adaptation are present in isolates from
birds and humans, respectively. If the avian traits
were always found in avian isolates and human
traits always in human isolates, only the shaded
cells on the main diagonal would be filled. In
such a case, however, it is hard to see how
viruses would ever make the jump from birds to
humans, since so many traits would have to
change simultaneously, and indeed the off-diag-
onal cells are not empty. Finding avian-adapted
traits in viruses isolated from humans most often
occurs in zoonotic cases, showing that not all
human-adapted traits are required for the first
human infection. In some cases there are also
Box 2. Granularity of pandemic risk prediction – for what
taxonomic level does it make sense?
Determining the appropriate taxonomic level for influenza virus risk assessment is a challenging
endeavor. Influenza virus subtype is a convenient classification but there can be substantial vari-
ation in estimable risk within subtype. For example, H5N1 viruses can be roughly segregated
into high pathogenicity and low pathogenicity phenotypes with the high pathogenicity variants
generating substantially greater concern for both human and animal populations. Even within
the high pathogenicity H5N1 variants, risk to animal populations and potential for adaptation to
humans is likely to vary by phylogenetic lineages or clades of viruses. Much of the difficulty for
predicting the threat posed by subtypes or coarse grained concepts of virus variants stems from
two factors: first, a lack of understanding of how genetic context affects the ability of a virus to
adapt for efficient spread in humans; and second, the critical, and geographically variable, role
of ecology in determining likelihood of cross species transmission.
Phylogenetic clade is a practical unit for risk prediction. However, in species where reassortment
is frequent, phylogenetic clade must be considered on a gene by gene basis. The definition of
phylogenetic clades can be challenging and arbitrary, but recent efforts to develop a unified
nomenclature for highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses may offer a transferrable framework for the
classification of other viruses (Smith and Donis, 2015; WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Work-
ing Group, 2008). Clades of viruses circulating in poultry, swine or other domestic animals with
extensive human interactions should be prioritized for surveillance and further study. Founda-
tional efforts are required to assess the diversity of viruses present in these animal populations,
particularly for low pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Further study will then be required to
assess the abundance and prevalence of different virus subtypes and clades, along with geo-
graphic spread and overlap with ecological risk factors(Hill et al., 2015; Gilbert et al., 2014),
e.g. live animal markets, cohabitation of humans and animals, and biosecurity in animal process-
ing facilities.
Antigenic characterization of animal influenza viruses should form part of a comprehensive risk
assessment, particularly of viruses from swine and possibly dogs. Swine influenza virus diversity
is driven in large part by introductions of viruses from humans to swine (Nelson et al., 2015,
2014; Lewis et al., 2016). The substantial antigenic diversity of viruses circulating in swine and
antigenic differences with viruses circulating in humans poses an ever increasing risk for re-intro-
duction into humans. Much of the antigenic variation in swine has a strong relationship to phylo-
genetic clade (Lewis et al., 2016). Similarly, the high contact rates between humans and dogs,
combined with increased circulation of H3N2 canine influenza viruses, may present increasing
opportunities for reassortment (Na et al., 2015) and for zoonotic infections (Flanagan et al.,
2012).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.003
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viruses isolated from humans after a pandemic
starts that retain some degree of avian-like
traits, and we discuss these in more detail in the
text – these represent the greatest challenge to
use of genotypic or phenotypic information for
pandemic prediction because they run the risk
of false negatives. The other off-diagonal cell,
which represents avian isolates with some
human-like traits, simply shows that some circu-
lation of viruses in birds is possible without the
classical ’avian’ phenotypes. How this happens is
a phenomenon worthy of further study. We con-
clude with some recommendations for future
research and for the practice of pandemic risk
assessment.
Trait 1: Hemagglutinin receptor
binding specificity
A. Definition of the trait
Attachment of an influenza virus to a host cell
requires binding of the viral HA to a sialylated
glycan receptor (sialic acid) on the surface of the
host cell. Cells of the avian gut and a minority of
cells in deep lung in mammals predominantly
express receptors terminated with an a2,3-
linked sialic acid: hereafter, a2,3 glycans or avian
receptors (Russell et al., 2006;
Gambaryan et al., 1997; van Riel et al., 2006;
Shinya et al., 2006). By contrast, in humans and
other mammals, upper respiratory epithelial cells
express mainly glycan receptors terminated by
a2,6-linked sialic acid: a2,6 glycans or human
receptors (Stevens et al., 2006; Shinya et al.,
2006; Chandrasekaran et al., 2008). The human
upper respiratory epithelium is the primary tar-
get site for infection of human-adapted viruses,
and infection at this site is thought to be a pre-
requisite for efficient human-to-human transmis-
sion via respiratory droplets. Thus, it appears
that human adaptation of an HA is associated
with a switch in its binding preference from avian
to human receptors. Receptor binding is not
either-or; human-adapted influenza virus HA
may show some binding to avian receptors, and
vice versa.
Receptor binding preference is defined as the
ratio of affinity (or avidity) of an HA molecule for
an a2,6 glycan relative to that for an a2,3 gly-
can, with higher values associated with greater
human adaptation. The evolution of receptor
binding specificity is driven by the host environ-
ment, with selection for specificity during the
infection process within a host and during the
process of transmission. The error-prone
replication of influenza genomes can facilitate
rapid emergence of viruses with amino acid sub-
stitutions that alter the receptor binding charac-
teristics of the HA (Lakdawala et al., 2015).
Increased transmissibility may result from mam-
malian receptor adaptation, either because the
virus shedding form the infected donor host is
increased, or because the ability of virus to infect
the recipient host at a low dose is enhanced, or
for both of these reasons. Recent experimental
evidence in ferrets implicates the soft palate as
an important site of selection for a2,6 specificity
(Lakdawala et al., 2015).
B. Genetic and structural determinants of
hemagglutinin-receptor interactions
Preference for binding human or avian glycan
receptors is determined by the structure of the
viral HA. Except for a few conserved amino acids
in the sialic acid receptor binding pocket, the
influenza HA has considerable structural plastic-
ity to evolve variation at the rim of the pocket to
engage different sialic acid linkages. Impor-
tantly, antigenic regions of the HA are located
nearby regions that determine receptor-binding
preference, meaning that selection for antigenic
escape may be constrained by the need to main-
tain receptor preference (Koel et al., 2013).
More speculatively, selection for changes in
receptor preference might also alter recognition
of the HA by host antibodies.
Conformation of hemagglutinin as a determi-
nant of receptor binding preference. Although
the co-crystal structures of HA and sialylated gly-
cans have not been solved for all pairs, there is evi-
dence that avian- or human-adapted HA bind to
different conformations of the avian and human
receptors: the cis conformation of human recep-
tors and the trans conformation of avian receptors
(Stevens et al., 2006; Ha et al., 2001,
2003; Gamblin et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2009;
Xu et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Lin et al.,
2012; Yang et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). This
finding has led to the concept of “hallmark” resi-
dues within the receptor-binding site of avian-
and human-adapted HAs. Avian-adapted HAs
typically carry Glu at position 190, Gln at position
226, and Gly and position 228 (H3 numbering),
and the Gln226->Leu, Gly228->Ser substitutions
have been associated with a switch to human
receptor preference in HAs of H2, H3
(Matrosovich et al., 2000), and H5
(Chutinimitkul et al., 2010) viruses. In H1 HA,
Glu190fiAsp and Gly225fiAsp have been con-
sidered as hallmark amino acid changes to switch
receptor specificity leading to greater human
Lipsitch et al. eLife 2016;5:e18491. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491 6 of 38
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Box 3. Novel approaches to identifying genomic predictors
of traits and transmission phenotypes.
The advent of inexpensive, large-scale sequencing, combined with improved computing power
and novel algorithms to interpret nucleotide and protein sequences, have generated new
approaches to characterizing the genotype-trait and genotype-transmission phenotype maps in
influenza viruses. Some are well-established, while others are under active development. They
include:
Protein structural analysis to identify properties of individual amino acid residues and pairs of
residues. A number of approaches have been devised to make use of databases of genome
sequences and inferred protein sequences of influenza virus isolates, alone or in combination
with metadata on the source (species), date of isolation and passage history of the isolates.
Characterizing the predictors – at the level of individual amino acid residues within a protein –
of variability or conservation can assist in identifying the major selection pressures on that pro-
tein. Evolutionary analysis of the predictors of high rates of nonsynonymous substitutions within
HA showed solvent accessibility and proximity to the sialic acid receptor binding site are the
strongest predictors of high nonsynonymous evolutionary rates (Meyer and Wilke, 2015). Com-
parisons of residue-specific evolutionary rates in avian and human lineages can help to assess
which sites are specifically involved in human adaptation and which may be evolving in avian res-
ervoirs with potential consequences for human adaptation (Meyer et al., 2013).
Innovative use of metadata associated with sequences deposited in databases will be required
to ensure that computational inferences from these databases are reliable. For example, meth-
ods that aim to identify sites under positive selection in the HA protein frequently find regions
or sites that seem to contradict experimental evidence (Meyer and Wilke, 2015; Tusche et al.,
2012; Kratsch et al., 2016). Several of these apparent contradictions can be resolved by
accounting for viral passaging. For example, passaging in regular MDCK cells produces a strong
signal of positive adaptation underneath the sialic-acid binding site; this signal is entirely absent
in unpassaged virus or virus passaged in SIAT1 MDCK cells (McWhite et al., 2016). At the same
time, passage bias mutations are assumed to increase fitness of the strain in the respective spe-
cies and are often necessary to grow in culture at all. Therefore, sites associated with isolates
passaged in mammalian cultures vs. those passaged in embryonated hen’s eggs have the
potential to further identify sites associated with mammalian or human adaptation.
Metadata can also help to point to individual amino acids associated with human adaptation.
For example, one proposed computational approach is to find potentially zoonotic human-iso-
lated sequences when the majority of their database hits from preceding years were of animal
origin. This serves, on one hand, as systematic survey to derive lists of times and places of likely
zoonotic events and, on the other hand, provides close sequence pairs of zoonotic human and
their putative animal precursors. In those pairs, common sites that repeatedly changed from the
animal to the human zoonotic isolates could be reasoned as being involved in human adapta-
tion. Combining these sites with those from passage changes, provides strong evidence for the
involvement of a particular site in host adaptation.
Network analysis of the level of sequence covariation of pairs of residues among protein
sequences in the database has led to the identification of groups of mutually covarying sites,
which have been used to define features of the HA protein that play a role in determining gly-
can receptor usage (Kasson et al., 2009; Kasson and Pande, 2009). Complementary to such
covariation analysis is the analysis of predicted molecular interactions. Using X-ray co-crystal
structures or modeled structural complexes of HA-glycan receptors, molecular features have
been defined as distinct networks of inter-residue interactions involving key residues that make
contacts with the different glycan receptor topologies. These features go beyond hallmark resi-
due analyses and more accurately predict how amino acid variations in the receptor binding site
impact the inter-residue interactions and glycan receptor binding specificity (Raman et al.,
2014). Similarly, network analysis of amino acid residues predicted to have significant interac-
tions has shown that antigenic sites on the HA interact with residues controlling glycan receptor
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binding specificity, and that changes in these antigenic residues can then lead to changes in
receptor-binding affinity (Soundararajan et al., 2011).
It seems likely that as these different lines of evidence – structural location, biophysical interac-
tion, sequence covariation, sequence evolutionary rates, association with zoonotic or in vitro
adaptation, etc.—begin to be understood at the resolution of individual amino acids within an
influenza protein, such overlapping approaches will yield clearer understanding of the genetic
and structural bases of host adaptation to human infection and transmission. A significant step
toward such integration is the recent release of the FluSurver online tool which automatizes
influenza sequence and structure analysis and highlights mutations that could alter the discussed
traits based on extensive literature-derived genotype to phenotype lists, structural visualization
of the mutation positions and their geographic and temporal frequency of occurrence and co-
occurrence for epidemiological relevance (http://flusurver.bii.a-star.edu.sg and directly from
within GISAID http://www.gisaid.org). In particular, the tool has been successful in picking up
mutations affecting host receptor binding (Maurer-Stroh et al., 2014) as well as pH depen-
dency (Cotter et al., 2014; Maurer-Stroh et al., 2010). However, also in this approach, annota-
tions of the effects of mutations are based on inference from similarity to mutations studied in
specific sequence contexts, which in most cases will not be identical to the investigated input
sequences.
Association studies. Understanding the genetic basis of adaptive phenotypic change is a central
goal in biology, and influenza poses special challenges and advantages relative to other organ-
isms. Association studies have begun mapping the genomes of Arabidopsis thaliana to over 107
quantitative traits and the genomes of humans to over 100,000 (Bergelson and Roux, 2010;
Leslie et al., 2014). These studies often investigate genetic variation at the scales of single
nucleotide polymorphisms, alleles, and loci. Motif-based approaches have already proven useful
in influenza (e.g., the insertion of multiple basic amino acids indicates highly pathogenic H5 and
H7), and such simple, robust correlations simplify the prediction of phenotypic traits. Recent
investigations of influenza (Thyagarajan and Bloom, 2014; Ashenberg et al., 2013;
Pinilla et al., 2012) have shown that many mutations have roughly consistent impacts across
diverse backgrounds. A complication of all association studies is confounding from genetic link-
age and diverse environmental selective pressures. Although influenza’s genes might be tightly
linked over short time scales, the virus evolves quickly, and many traits can be assumed to be
under stabilizing selection. Thus, association studies that appear statistically impractical now
may be feasible with a few more years of expanded surveillance.
As reviewed here, however, influenza often breaks simple genetic rules, perhaps due to epista-
sis (e.g., [Bloom et al., 2010]). High-dimensional genotype-phenotype relationships obscure
simple correlations from association studies. A relevant lesson comes from The Cancer Genome
Atlas (TCGA), which amassed sequences from thousands of diverse tumors to investigate the
mutations leading to different cancer types. Although metastatic cancers are typically conceptu-
alized as possessing six main phenotypic traits (Hanahan and Weinberg, 2011), TCGA revealed
that the genetic commonality among tumors of any given type is shockingly low
(Kandoth et al., 2013; Ledford, 2015). Human genomes are much larger and more complex
than influenza’s, however, and so it is possible that an influenza atlas might reveal more pat-
terns, which could inspire hypothesis-driven experiments (Weinberg, 2010).
High-throughput, large-scale screens of mutational effects on hemagglutinin receptor binding.
Binding of upper-respiratory-tract glycans by the influenza virus hemagglutinin is one of the
best-understood ingredients in making a virus capable of efficient human transmission. Yet the
viral sequence determinants of this trait have been mapped only for a limited number of var-
iants. A systematic screening strategy to scan the genetic “landscape” for sequences with a
preference for human glycan receptors might include four components: (1) selection of viral
genetic background, (2) large-scale mutagenesis, (3) screening and selection, and (4) confirma-
tory assays. Because both mutations near and far from the sialic-acid-binding site on hemagglu-
tinin have been shown to alter glycan specificity, this should be based on a minimally biased
approach to mutagenesis: screening combinations of all possible substitutions at all hemaggluti-
nin residues that are not absolutely conserved across known subtypes. Critical considerations
include choice of viral genetic background (both subtype and strain identity), extent of
combinatorial screening (if conserved sites are omitted, every mutant containing changes at up
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adaptation (Glaser et al., 2005; Tumpey et al.,
2007). The determinants of specificity are
reviewed in much more detail in (Paulson and de
Vries, 2013).
Additional structural features involved in
receptor binding preference. The cis and trans
definition of glycan conformation does not fully
describe HA binding to a range of structurally
diverse glycans displayed on human respiratory
cells and tissues (Chandrasekaran et al., 2008).
This limitation motivated studies that revisited
the definition of glycan conformation, extending
the conformational analysis beyond the terminal
sialic acid linkage to describe overall topology
and dynamics of the glycan receptor upon bind-
ing to the receptor-binding site of avian and
human-adapted HAs (Chandrasekaran et al.,
2008; Xu et al., 2009). HA sequence determi-
nants of preference for the “cone”-like topology
of avian receptors, versus the “umbrella”-like
topology of human receptors, are still being
defined (Raman et al., 2014).
C. Experimental assays to measure
hemagglutinin receptor binding
specificity
Experimental evidence on differential binding of
avian and human viruses to sialic acid receptors
in avian and human conformations, respectively,
was first obtained by hemagglutination assays
with erythrocytes whose surfaces had been
chemically modified to display glycans terminat-
ing with either homogeneous a2,3 or homoge-
neous a2,6-linked sialic acids (Paulson and
Rogers, 1987). Subsequent analysis of the rep-
ertoire of glycan structures in erythrocytes of
various animal species informed the use of cells
from different species as probes of HA receptor
binding preference in hemagglutination assays
(Ito et al., 1997).
Greater precision and reproducibility has
been achieved with the use of purified sialylated
glycans to create solid-phase binding assays
with fluorogenic or enzymatic detection
(Gambaryan et al., 2006; Gambaryan and
Matrosovich, 1992). With these assays, it is pos-
sible to characterize the relative direct binding
of whole virions or recombinant trimeric HA
oligomers to glycans attached to a solid phase
or the competition of such glycans with binding
to a generic glycoprotein attached to the solid
phase (Gambaryan and Matrosovich, 1992). In
recent work, biosensor interferometry and ther-
mophoresis have been used to measure glycan-
binding avidities and affinities in a more precise
manner and to relate the two (Xiong et al.,
2013a). The development of glycan microarrays
represented a turning point in the analysis of
influenza virus receptor binding specificity,
because it allowed simultaneous evaluation of
virion or recombinant HA binding to a large rep-
ertoire of sialoglycans (Stevens et al., 2006;
Blixt et al., 2004; Childs et al., 2009). Several
measures of preference for an HA molecule or
whole virus have been defined, including the
ratio of the number of a2,6 to a2,3 glycans
bound (Stevens et al., 2006a, 2006b) or the
corresponding ratio of binding affinity or avidity
(Imai et al., 2012; Xiong et al., 2013a). A limita-
tion to predictive power is that glycans tested
on current arrays may not match those present
in the human respiratory tract (Walther et al.,
2013). These arrays may also not present gly-
cans in the same fashion as respiratory epithelial
cells, so strategies such as measuring the bind-
ing of labelled viruses to human respiratory tis-
sues (Chutinimitkul et al., 2010) or explant
cultures (Chan et al., 2013) may be promising
alternatives, although challenges remain in stan-
dardization and quantification of such assays.
Structural studies of wild-type and mutant HA in
complex with representative sialoglycans pro-
vide the ultimate level of detail by characterizing
interactions at the atomic level. X-ray
to 4 simultaneous sites could be screened with substantial effort), and design of highly parallel
screening, selection, and confirmatory assays. The mutagenesis and screening involved would
be extremely large in scope: (before eliminating conserved residues, all 4-site mutnats ~[550
residues x 20 amino acids]4 = 1.4 x 1016 variants for each subtype tested). However, some
computational pre-screening to narrow the set of residues tested combined with contemporary
mutagenesis and screening technologies such as deep scanning codon mutagenesis
(Thyagarajan and Bloom, 2014; Bloom, 2015; Fowler and Fields, 2014) make such an
endeavor feasible.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.004
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crystallography advances in recent years have
accelerated structural determination, and similar
progress in recombinant protein purification
techniques combined with robotic crystal screen-
ing have reduced the amount of protein and
labor required.
In summary, genetic and protein sequence
analysis, glycan arrays, and X-ray crystallography
studies provide complementary data towards
understanding the sialoglycan interactions of
emerging viruses, with tradeoffs of equipment
and reagent costs and throughput against level
of precision and detail provided.
D. Receptor binding preference as a
predictor of host adaptation of influenza
viruses and pandemic risk
At present, estimating the contribution of recep-
tor specificity to the pandemic risk posed by a
novel virus relies primarily on the similarity
between the receptor binding characteristics of
the emerging virus and that of the most closely
related HA with known transmissibility among
humans or a surrogate animal model.
As noted above, hallmark residues have sub-
stantial predictive power. These distinct sets of
hallmark residues in the H1, H2 and H3 subtype
(Paulson and de Vries, 2013) correlate with
human-adaptation in known sequences collected
from birds or humans (Connor et al., 1994;
Paulson and de Vries, 2013); they induce
changes in receptor-binding specificity when
introduced experimentally (Chen et al., 2012;
Leigh et al., 1995); and experimental selection
for receptor binding in vitro (Chen et al., 2012)
or in ferrets (Imai et al., 2012) cause these
changes to appear.
However, hallmark residue predictions of
receptor-binding specificity are imperfect, as
evidenced by a failure to switch in vitro recep-
tor-binding preference from avian to human
when changes observed in H5N1 strains after
selection in ferret gain-of-function experiments
were introduced to other H5N1 viruses
(Tharakaraman et al., 2013). The involvement
of other features in human adaptation, such as
the topology of the bound HA-receptor com-
plex, further complicate the genetic prediction
of human adaptation, as the residues involved in
these features are less well characterized
(Shriver et al., 2009).
In principle, phenotypic assays that directly
measure the receptor-binding preference of HA
– if performed under realistic conditions that
capture the interaction of the HA trimer with the
receptor (Gambaryan et al., 1997;
Takemoto et al., 1996; Collins and Paulson,
2004)—may better capture the trait of interest
than genetic predictions of this preference.
However, even here, a simple equivalence
between binding preference for a2,6-linked gly-
cans and pandemic risk could be misleading.
Several viruses circulating in humans during the
early phase of previous pandemics were found
to show either a preference for avian receptors
(Rogers and D’Souza, 1989; Connor et al.,
1994) or a mixed preference for both human
and avian receptors (Rogers and D’Souza,
1989; Glaser et al., 2005; Childs et al., 2009).
In the case of early 2009 pandemic viruses, find-
ings are mixed (Childs et al., 2009; Chen et al.,
2011). Some of the findings of dual or avian
specificity may reflect artifacts introduced when
human isolates were passaged in eggs before
receptor specificity was assayed; alternatively,
they may genuinely reflect a transitional stage in
the evolution of HA genes in human populations
after transmission from other species
(Connor et al., 1994; Stevens et al., 2006;
Glaser et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2010),
(Table 2). Consistent with this latter possibility,
an H5N1 virus isolated from a human zoonotic
case in Vietnam displayed strong avian receptor
preference (Yamada et al., 2006). This prefer-
ence changed in the course of experiments to
adapt it to respiratory droplet transmission in
ferrets (Imai et al., 2012). Taken together, these
findings confirm that there is a strong correlation
between measured receptor preference and the
host from which a virus is isolated. However,
they raise questions about the predictive value
of human receptor binding preference. Indeed,
the examples of mixed receptor preference in
human isolates from the early phase of the H1 or
H2 pandemics suggest that the ability to evolve
human receptor specificity over a chain of
human infections, which may be present in many
avian-receptor-adapted viruses, may be suffi-
cient for pandemic emergence.
In summary, detection of a human receptor
preference in a spillover virus may be an indica-
tion of increased risk, but exclusive human
receptor preference is probably not necessary
for an influenza A virus to initiate a pandemic.
With several possible exceptions noted above,
most viruses isolated to date fall within the
shaded cells in Table 2, which indicates concor-
dance between the source of the isolate and the
virus trait. Thus, prioritizing pandemic counter-
measures against virus lineages with inferred or
measured human receptor preference will likely
lead to better targeting of such
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Figure 1. Key phenotypic traits for the adaptation of avian influenza viruses to replicate efficiently in humans. (A) A
switch in receptor binding preference from avian-like (a2,3-linked sialic acid) to human-like (a2,6-linked sialic acid)
receptors. The human form on the left shows the typical distribution of human adapted influenza viruses
determined by their receptor binding preference for a2,6, linked SA that is predominantly expressed in the upper
respiratory tract but also in the lungs. The human form on the right shows that infection with avian influenza
viruses is concentrated in the lungs where their preferred a2,3 linked SA receptor is expressed. (B) Lower HA pH of
activation and increased polymerase complex efficiency. Free-floating viruses that enter the human respiratory
tract (upper part of figure) encounter mucus and a mildly acidic extracellular environment that act as innate
barriers to virus infection. If NA is able to desialylate decoy receptors on mucus and HA has a sufficiently low pH
of activation, then the virus particle may reach the apical surface of the respiratory epithelium intact. There
through a multiplicity of interactions between HA and cell-surface sialic acid, the virus enters the target cell. After
the virus is internalized, it passes through the endosomal pathway where the pH is progressively decreased. The
low pH of the endosomal environment triggers an irreversible conformational change in HA that fuses the viral and
endosomal membranes and ultimately results in the release of virus genetic material in the form of the viral
ribonucleoprotein complex (vRNP) into the cell cytoplasm. The eight vRNPs are subsequently imported into the
cell nucleus by interactions between the vRNPs and cellular nuclear import machinery. Inside the nucleus the virus
polymerase complex replicates the virus genome in conjunction with co-opted cell proteins.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.005
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Table 1. Influenza virus adaptations that appear to be required for human-to-human transmission.
Trait Adaptation
HA receptor binding
specificity
Preference for a2,6-linked mammalian sialic acid receptors over a2,3-linked avian ones
(Russell et al., 2006)
HA pH of activation HA avoids extracellular inactivation and undergoes conformational changes leading to
membrane fusion at appropriate pH for human cells (5.0–5.4 or perhaps 5.5)
(Russell, 2014)
Polymerase complex
efficiency
Efficient replication in human cells (Cauldwell et al., 2014; Naffakh et al., 2008)
Virus morphology Filamentous morphology associated with several adaptations to mammals (Seladi-
Schulman et al., 2014; Seladi-Schulman et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2014;
Beale et al., 2014)
Length of NA stalk Longer stalk of NA required to penetrate human mucus and deaggregate virions
(Blumenkrantz et al., 2013)
Antagonism of interferon
production
Species-specific binding of the NS1 protein to host factors (Rajsbaum et al., 2012)
HA-NA “balance” Substrate selectivity and catalytic rate of NA are calibrated to “balance” avidity of HA
for the cell-surface glycan receptor (Zanin et al., 2015; Baum and Paulson, 1991;
Yen et al., 2011; Handel et al., 2014)
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.006
Table 2. Hemagglutinin receptor binding preference and examples of viruses isolated from avian and
human hosts showing preference for human or avian receptors, or mixed preference. Yellow-shaded
cells show concordance between expected and observed properties.
Avian receptor preference Mixed receptor preference Human receptor preference
Expected sequence,
trait. Hallmark
residues HA 190, 225
(H1,H3), 226 (H3);
many others
Preferential binding to a2,3
sialylated glycans. HA
190Glu, 225Gly, 226Gln
Similar binding to both
classes of glycans
Preferential binding to a2,6
sialylated glycans. HA
190Asp, 225Glu, 226Leu
Found in avian isolates Many examples: many avian
isolates of subtypes H5N1
(Russell et al., 2012;
Yamada et al., 2006), H2
(Connor et al., 1994) and H3
(Connor et al., 1994)
avian isolates of H5N5
(Li et al., 2015), North
American H7 (Belser et al.,
2008), H7N9
(Schrauwen et al., 2016), as
well as examples from H2
(Connor et al., 1994;
Liu et al., 2009) and H3
(Connor et al., 1994)
Some H9N2 avian isolates
(Matrosovich et al., 2001;
Li et al., 2014)
Found in human
isolates
H5N1 zoonotic isolate
(Imai et al., 2012;
Yamada et al., 2006); one
H1N1 isolate from 1957
(Rogers and D’Souza, 1989)
*; some early H2N2
pandemic/seasonal isolates
(Connor et al., 1994;
Pappas et al., 2010;
Matrosovich et al., 2000)*
Early H1N1 pandemic
isolates from 2009
(Childs et al., 2009) and
1918 (Stevens et al., 2006;
Glaser et al., 2005); several
H1N1 from the 1918-1956
period (Rogers and
D’Souza, 1989)*; early H2N2
isolate from 1958
(Pappas et al., 2010); human
isolate of zoonotic H7N9
(Xiong et al., 2013b)
Many examples: H1N1 post-
1977 (Rogers and D’Souza,
1989); early H1N1 pandemic
isolates from 2009
(Chen et al., 2011) and 1918
(Stevens et al., 2006;
Glaser et al., 2005); most
human H2 and H3 seasonal
isolates (Connor et al., 1994;
Matrosovich et al., 2000)
*These anomalous results are speculated by the authors to be possibly, or even probably the result of laboratory
adaptation to egg passage and may not reflect the properties of the primary isolate. A possible counter to this
interpretation is that it is seen only in the earliest isolates from human pandemic viruses, while nearly all isolates
from after the pandemic year, which should also have been passaged in eggs, show human-adapted phenotypes.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.007
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countermeasures on average – that is, increase
the chance of taking countermeasures against a
strain that truly poses pandemic risk. However,
the counterexamples of human-to-human trans-
mission of incompletely adapted viruses (bottom
left and middle cells of Table 2) suggest that in
particular cases, reliance on this trait as a neces-
sary condition to justify countermeasures may
not identify all virus lineages that are in fact
capable of causing a pandemic.
Trait 2: Hemagglutinin pH of
activation
A. Definition of the trait
After entry into the cell, influenza viruses are
internalized into endosomes, where the pH is
progressively decreased. The pH of early and
late endosomes, as well as lysosomes, varies
between cell types, tissues, and host species.
The HA must undergo a low-pH triggered con-
formational change to a state capable of fusing
the viral and endosomal membranes. For
human-adapted viruses, HA activation typically
occurs between pH 5.0 to 5.5. HA variants that
undergo this transition at a higher pH, as is typi-
cal for avian influenza isolates, are poorly
adapted to infect human cells because the tran-
sition can happen prematurely, leading to extra-
cellular inactivation in the mildly acidic
mammalian respiratory tract (Di Lella et al.,
2016; Zaraket et al., 2013a) The pH of activa-
tion can be defined as a continuous measure-
ment representing the least acidic (highest) pH
at which a particular HA molecule is triggered.
Table 3. Hemagglutinin pH of acivation.Yellow-shaded cells show concordance between expected
and observed properties.
Avian-adapted for transmissibility Human-adapted for transmissibility
Expected
trait
pH of fusion >5.4 (Reed et al., 2010) pH of fusion 5.0-5.4 (5.5 for early
H1N1pdm) (Russier et al., 2016)
Found in
avian
isolates
Avian H1-H4, H11 isolates (Galloway et al., 2013;
Russier et al., 2016; DuBois et al., 2011; Reed et al.,
2010)
Avian H5, H8, H9,H10,H14,H15 isolates
(Galloway et al., 2013)
Found in
human
isolates
H5N1(Imai et al., 2012; Linster et al., 2014) and H7N9
(Schrauwen et al., 2016) human zoonotic isolates with
pH 5.6. One human H1N1 (2008) isolate.
Human isolates of H1N1 (1918 and 2009
lineages), H2N2, H3N2 (Galloway et al.,
2013)
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.008
Table 4. Polymerase complex efficiency; entries list amino acid at PB2 627, though other residues are
clearly relevant to this trait.Yellow-shaded cells show concordance between expected and observed
properties.
Avian-adapted Human-adapted
Expected
trait
Low efficiency in mammals, PB2 590/591 G/Q, 627E,
701D
High efficiency in mammals, PB2 590/591 S/
R, PB2 627K, 701N;
Found in
avian
isolates
Nearly all avian sequences in databases as of 2005
(Chen et al., 2006)
A few entries in databases show sequences
associated with human adaptation as of 2005
(Chen et al., 2006)***
Found in
human
isolates
zoonotic H9N2 (Chen et al., 2006); some zoonotic
H5N1 (de Jong et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2006); some
zoonotic H7N9 (associated with milder course)
(Sha et al., 2016); one zoonotic H5N6 (Zhang et al.,
2016)**
Pandemic and seasonal H1N1, H2N2, H3N2
from 1918-2008 (Cauldwell et al., 2014);
some zoonotic H5N1 (Chen et al., 2006);
some zoonotic H7N9 (associated with more
severe course) (Sha et al., 2016); H1N1pdm
(Herfst et al., 2010)*; one zoonotic H5N6
and one zoonotic H10N8 (Zhang et al.,
2016)
* the role of amino acids 590 and 591 in adaptation was not recognized until after the 2009 strain had already
emerged (Mehle and Doudna, 2009); it has the residues associated with avian adaptation at sites 627 and 701
that were known at that time (Herfst et al., 2010).
** complete sequence information not given in the paper
*** the rarity of these raises questions about possible sequencing errors.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.009
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Greater acid stability (lower pH of activation) is
associated with greater human adaptation.
B. Functional, structural and genetic
determinants of hemagglutinin pH of
activation and its consequences
The HA is synthesized and folded such that the
fusion peptide is buried and inactive until spe-
cific activation signals are provided. The struc-
tural changes that expose the fusion peptide
and lead to fusion have been described in detail
(Skehel and Wiley, 2000). If the virion is
exposed to sufficiently low pH outside of a host
or host cell, the HA protein undergoes irrevers-
ible structural changes too early and is unable to
mediate virus entry; such virions become inacti-
vated. Thus the term acid stability is more
broadly used to define the threshold for
acidification that triggers membrane fusion (in
the endosome) or inactivation (if triggered out-
side of the cell for an HA that is not sufficiently
stable). During endocytosis, an influenza virion is
exposed to sequentially lower pH values in early
endosomes (pH 6.0–6.5), late endosomes (pH
5.0–5.5), and lysosomes (pH 4.6–5.0)
(Mellman et al., 1986). If the HA is too stable,
and fusion is not triggered in the acidic endo-
some of the host cell, further traffic into lyso-
somes results in virus inactivation by lysosomal
proteases (Skehel and Wiley, 2000).
Based on surveillance studies, human-trans-
missible influenza isolates appear to have HA
proteins that are more acid stable (have a lower
activation pH) than avian influenza viruses (Rus-
sell, 2014). The HA activation pH values for
H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 seasonal viruses during
Figure 2. Influenza A polymerase complex from structure PDB:4WSB (Reich et al., 2014) consisting of PA (grey),
PB1 (cyan), PB2 (green) and bound vRNA promoter (purple). Key host adaptation sites are indicated as red balls.
Sites for importin-alpha interaction are shown as blue balls. Structure visualized with YASARA (Krieger and
Vriend, 2014).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.010
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Box 4. Ferret model: validity and limitations in pandemic
risk assessment.
The use of small mammalian models in influenza virus pathogenesis and transmission has proven
invaluable for the study of these complex, polygenic traits. The ferret model is particularly valu-
able, as ferrets are highly susceptible to most influenza A viruses without the need for prior host
adaptation. However, even this gold-standard model is not a true substitute for humans. Below,
we summarize the benefits, drawbacks, and alternatives to the ferret model for the study of
influenza.
Validity. Influenza is a respiratory pathogen in humans, and employing mammalian models that
possess comparable lung physiology permits a greater extrapolation of results from the labora-
tory. Importantly, the linkage types and distribution of sialic acids throughout the ferret respira-
tory tract are generally comparable to humans (Jayaraman et al., 2012; Jia et al., 2014): like
humans, ferrets express the sialic acid N-acetylneuraminic acid (Neu5Ac), but not the sialic acid
N-glycolylneuraminic acid (Neu5Gc), on respiratory epithelia. As a result, ferrets are uniquely
suited for the study of influenza viruses compared with other small mammalian models which
express Neu5Gc (Ng et al., 2014). Furthermore, human and avian influenza viruses exhibit com-
parable binding to upper and lower respiratory tract tissues in ferrets and humans (van Riel
et al., 2006; Shinya et al., 2006).
Secondly, ferrets infected with influenza viruses demonstrate numerous clinical signs and symp-
toms of infection associated with human disease. Ferrets infected with human influenza viruses
often exhibit transient weight loss, transient fever, and sneezing, whereas infection with selected
HPAI viruses in this species can lead to pronounced weight loss, sustained fever, lethargy, dys-
pnea, and neurological complications (Belser et al., 2009). Thus, ferrets represent a preclinical
model to assess the ability of novel vaccine and antiviral treatments to mitigate influenza virus.
As ferrets are a suitable model for the coincident study of pathogenesis and transmission, this
model allows for a greater understanding of virus-host interactions and the interplay between
both of these parameters.
Finally, the ferret model can yield valuable insights about the potential human-to-human trans-
missibility of influenza viruses – the critical determinant of pandemic risk. A recent meta-analysis
showed that estimates of transmissibility derived from ferret respiratory droplet transmission
studies could explain 66% of measured variation in human transmissibility, for influenza subtypes
that have been detected in humans (Buhnerkempe et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is a strong
statistical relationship between the attack rates measured in particular ferret experiments and
the probability that the influenza strain in question is capable of sustained transmission among
humans: if two-thirds or more of contact ferrets become infected via respiratory droplets, then
the strain is likely to have pandemic potential (see figure). However, extrapolation of this rela-
tionship to novel strains is inherently risky, and variable outcomes observed for H7N9 influenza
transmission in ferrets highlight the potential for false alarms. Further analysis of ferret transmis-
sion experiments, ideally in concert with molecular and virological research, could raise their
sensitivity and specificity for identifying pandemic threats.
Limitations. There is no ‘perfect’ small mammalian model for influenza. A longstanding chal-
lenge of the ferret model has been limited availability of ferret-specific commercial reagents
compared with other models, though recent sequencing of the ferret genome should improve
this situation (Peng et al., 2014). Ethical considerations, and the size and cost of ferrets, neces-
sitate generally small sample sizes in ferret experiments, limiting statistical power (Belser et al.,
2013). Like other vertebrate models, the ferret is not appropriate for high-throughput screens,
so research in the ferret model is most potent when complemented with in vitro and computa-
tional approaches. Finally, ferrets are not well suited to model the multiple influenza exposures
over several years that may be experienced by humans and may mold their immune responses
in ways that affect the infection risk with subsequent viruses (Andrews et al., 2015). Studies of
first influenza infection in ferrets may thus overestimate infection and/or transmission risk rela-
tive to that in populations with a history of prior infection with related viruses (Belser et al.,
2016).
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the 20th Century range from pH 5.0 to 5.4
(Galloway et al., 2013). In 2009, emerging pan-
demic H1N1 viruses had HA activation pH values
of approximately 5.5, but numerous subsequent
isolates have acquired mutations that lower the
activation pH to the range of the 20th Century
human influenza viruses (Cotter et al., 2014;
Maurer-Stroh et al., 2010; Russier et al.,
2016). Broad surveys of avian and swine influ-
enza isolates have shown that HA activation pH
can vary substantially with a range from pH 4.6–
6.0 (Galloway et al., 2013; Scholtissek, 1985).
Among avian viruses, low-pathogenic duck
viruses appear to range in acid stability from pH
5.3–6.0 and highly pathogenic avian viruses
range from 5.6–6.0 (Galloway et al., 2013).
Consistent with observed patterns in natural
isolates, some experimental evidence indicates
that within the range of natural variation, lower
activation pH is adaptive for mammalian replica-
tion while higher activation pH is adaptive for
replication in avian hosts. For isolates of H5N1
Alternatives. The ferret is but one of several well-characterized mammalian models for influenza
virus. Mice are widely used in the field as they offer a greater availability of commercially avail-
able species-specific reagents, permit studies with greater statistical power due to larger sam-
ple sizes, and offer the advantage of transgenic animals. However, not all human influenza
viruses replicate well in mice without prior adaptation due to a predominance of avian-like
receptors in the murine respiratory tract; also mice do not display clinical signs and symptoms
of influenza that mimic humans, and are not a reliable model for virus transmission studies. The
guinea pig is another model, and offers several comparable advantages to ferrets, including
generally similar lung physiology to humans and potential for transmission studies. Experiments
in guinea pigs are often less expensive than in ferrets, because of lower husbandry costs and
reduced drug costs when dosing is based on body weight (Lowen and Palese, 2007). However,
guinea pigs do not exhibit clinical signs and symptoms of infection similar to humans, and do
not exhibit severe disease following infection with HPAI or pandemic influenza viruses, limiting
their utility for viral pathogenesis studies.
Box 4-figure 1. Ferret respiratory droplet transmission experiments predict the potential for sustained
human-to-human transmission of influenza viruses.
The solid line shows the weighted logistic regression relationship predicting the probability that a given
strain is supercritical (i.e. capable of sustained spread among humans), and the dashed lines show the 95%
confidence interval for the prediction. Filled circles show the measured secondary attack rates (SAR) in ferrets
for influenza subtypes that are known to be subcritical (blue) or supercritical (red) in humans. The filled pink
area shows the range of SAR for which the virus is significantly likely to be supercritical. Reprinted from
(Buhnerkempe et al., 2015).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.012
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.011
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Box 5. Role of seroepidemiology in pandemic risk
assessment.
Pandemic threat assessment can also be enhanced by immunological surveys of human popula-
tions in geographical area where strains of concern are known to be circulating (Van Kerkhove
et al., 2011). Serological surveys can help to estimate the frequency of spillover infections from
non-human to human hosts and also to assess the degree of cross reactivity arising from
endemic human strains that share recent genomic ancestors with non-human strains of concern
(Figure for Box 4).
Attempts have been made to use serological surveys to estimate the rate of spillover infections
to humans for recent strains of concern (Wang et al., 2012; Van Kerkhove et al., 2012). Some-
times blood samples are obtained from the general population (Chao et al., 2011) and other
times only high risk individuals are tested. Inherent measurement error and cross-reactivity
between human and non-human strains make the measurement of low rates of incidence prob-
lematic (Van Kerkhove et al., 2012). Confidence that serologic responses truly reflect zoonotic
transmission, rather than cross-reactivity with antibodies generated in response to human influ-
enza infection, may be enhanced by comparison of high-risk persons to those without known
exposure to zoonotic sources (Huang et al., 2015; Gomaa et al., 2015). Although there is evi-
dence of exposure of poultry workers to H5N1 influenza viruses in China, rates are much lower
than for other endemic non-human influenza viruses(Kim et al., 2011), such as H9N2
(Blair et al., 2013). More recent studies of exposure of high risk workers to the H7N9 lineage
suggest even higher rates of exposure to this new strain than has been observed in similar stud-
ies of H5N1 or H9N2 (Wang et al., 2014).
Even when rates of spillover can be estimated accurately, the use of such information in pan-
demic threat assessment is not obvious. Clearly, the first detected presence of human infections
for a given strain is of concern because the degree of transmissibility among humans is
unknown. Should the emergent strain fail to achieve sustained transmission, it is not immedi-
ately clear how best to use further information on the frequency of human spillover infections.
For example, should we interpret high sustained levels of human spillover as evidence of
increased risk because of the number of human infections, or as evidence of decreasing risk
because of the number of times the strain has failed to achieve sustained transmission?
Cross reactivity between non-human and human influenza strains has implications beyond the
measurement of spillover infections. Often levels of cross reactivity in humans may indicate
some degree of reduced population susceptibility (Worobey et al., 2014). All else equal, such
evidence of lower population susceptibility should reduce our level of concern about a pan-
demic threat from a particular virus, because even if it gains efficient human-to-human transmis-
sibility, its effective reproductive number and the proportion of the population at risk will be
less than for a virus to which there is no cross-reaction in the population. For example, older
individuals are thought to have been far less susceptible to pandemic H1N1 than were younger
individuals, because they had previously been exposed to similar strains early in life (Yu et al.,
2008). The low average age of infection with a swine variant form of H3N2 (H3N2v) in North
America (Jhung et al., 2013) is likely driven by reduced susceptibility in adults because of early
exposure to similar strains. Such immunological overlaps are likely to be a general feature of
influenza emergence because human strains frequently emerge into swine populations
(Nelson et al., 2015).
Data on reduced human susceptibility due to cross-reactivity must be synthesized with other
data used for threat assessment. In some cases, the aging of the part of the population with
prior exposure to a closely related strain could be the most important known factor increasing
the risk of an emergence event. Mechanistic models could be used to estimate the degree of
increased risk of emergence due to the aging of partially immune cohorts.
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highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, an
increase in HA activation pH within the range of
5.2–6.0 has been associated with increased repli-
cation and pathogenicity in chickens
(DuBois et al., 2011). Conversely, a mutation
that decreased the HA activation pH of A/
chicken/Vietnam/C58/2004 (H5N1) from 5.9 to
5.4 has been shown to attenuate virus growth
and prevent transmission in mallard ducks
(Reed et al., 2009) but increase virus growth in
the upper respiratory tracts of mice and ferrets
(Zaraket et al., 2013a, 2013b). Therefore, for
H5N1 viruses, a higher HA activation pH (5.6–
6.0) has been associated with a component of
fitness in birds, and a lower HA activation pH
(pH 5.0–5.4) has been linked to greater replica-
tion in the mammalian upper respiratory tract.
Two H5N1 viruses were adapted to transmit by
the airborne route between ferrets (Imai et al.,
2012; Herfst et al., 2012). After a switch in
receptor-binding specificity from avian to human
receptors (as described above) and deletion of a
glycosylation site, in both studies a final
mutation that decreased the HA activation pH
was shown to be necessary for airborne trans-
missibility in ferrets. However, these and other
studies have shown that this acid stability
change is not sufficient in the absence of human
receptor-binding specificity (Zaraket et al.,
2013a; Shelton et al., 2013). Recently, an HA
protein whose activation pH was 5.5 or lower
was shown to be required for the pandemic
potential of 2009 pH1N1 influenza virus
(Russier et al., 2016).
Nearly 100 mutations have been described
to alter the HA activation pH values of various
influenza A virus subtypes (Russell, 2014;
Mair et al., 2014). These acid stabilizing/desta-
bilizing residues are located throughout the
HA1 and HA2 subunits and tend to be posi-
tioned in regions of the molecule that undergo
large-scale changes in structure during pH-acti-
vated protein refolding (Russell, 2014;
Bullough et al., 1994; Wilson et al., 1981).
Mutations that modify the activation pH do not
appear to alter the prefusion HA protein
Box 5-figure 1. Transmission genomics of non-human transmission (top), spillover transmission (middle) and
sustained human transmission (bottom).
Haemagglutinin and neuraminidase gene segments have been color-coded to show an example shared
infection history in humans who are current spillover hosts for H7N9 and H9N2. These shared evolutionary
histories make it challenging to interpret serological studies of human spillover infections. Humans infected
by H2N2 or H3N2 will likely have cross-reactive antibodies to H9N2, because of the similarity between the
neuraminidase in those viruses. Because incidence of spill-over infection is likely to be low, even low-levels of
cross-reactivity can make the interpretation of serological studies of the general population challenging.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.014
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18491.013
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backbone in X-ray crystal structures
(DuBois et al., 2011; Weis et al., 1990;
de Vries et al., 2014). Therefore, an experi-
mental determination or modeling of intermedi-
ate structures may be required in order to
reliably predict HA pH of activation. Further
complicating genetic prediction of HA activation
pH values are observations that the NA and M
proteins can also modulate HA acid stability in
some cases (Huang et al., 1980; Su et al.,
2009; Reed et al., 2010; O’Donnell et al.,
2014).
C. Experimental assays to measure
hemagglutinin activation pH
A variety of experimental techniques have been
developed to measure the activation pH of the
HA protein, quantified as the highest pH at
which the HA protein is activated to undergo
the irreversible structural changes that mediate
membrane fusion (Hamilton et al., 2012), or
alternatively the highest pH at which, in the
absence of a membrane with which to fuse, the
HA protein is inactivated (inactivation pH). Clas-
sical membrane fusion assays have measured
the property in bulk (Hoekstra et al., 1984).
The pH of inactivation can be measured using
aliquots of virions that are exposed to buffers of
progressively lower pH and, after restoration to
neutral pH, assayed for retention or loss of
infectivity (Scholtissek, 1985). In many classical
fusion assays, fluorescent probes are used to
label virions, HA-expressing cells, and/or target
liposomes or cells. In these in vitro assays, HA-
bound target cells are typically exposed to buf-
fers of various pH values and then lipid and/or
contents mixing are measured by fluorescence
(Loyter et al., 1988; Hoekstra and Klappe,
1993). Alternatively, cell monolayers expressing
cleaved HA proteins can be pulsed by low-pH
buffers and then incubated to readout HA-
mediated cell-to-cell fusion either microscopi-
cally by syncytia formation or by reporter gene
expression. If HA conformation-specific mono-
clonal antibodies are available for the subtype
being studied, HA-expressing cells can be
pulsed with low pH and then analyzed for con-
formational changes by flow cytometry
(Reed et al., 2009). If such antibodies are lack-
ing, HA-expressing cells can be assayed for
trypsin susceptibility after low-pH exposure,
with prefusion HA being resistant and postfu-
sion HA susceptible to trypsin degradation
(Steinhauer et al., 1996). Recently, methods
have been developed to study HA activation
and membrane fusion by individual virions,
including single virion fusion using total internal
reflection fluorescence microscopy
(Hamilton et al., 2012).
Although the biological trigger for HA’s con-
formational change is a drop in pH, HA refolding
can also be triggered by other destabilizing
agents such as heat and urea (Scholtissek, 1985;
Ruigrok et al., 1986; Carr et al., 1997). Stability
at a lower pH is associated with stability at
higher temperatures and higher urea concentra-
tions, permitting the use of these agents instead
of, or in addition to, pH in assays of stability.
Thermal stability has been determined by mea-
suring the threshold temperature at which dena-
tured HA protein loses its ability to bind
erythrocytes and cause hemagglutination
(Linster et al., 2014).
D. Role of hemagglutinin activation pH in
pandemic risk prediction
Many questions remain regarding whether HA
activation pH plays a similar role in all influenza
subtypes isolated from a wide variety of avian
species. For early isolates of the H1N1pdm line-
age in 2009, the HA protein has an activation pH
of 5.5, which appears intermediate between the
canonical human (lower) and avian (higher)
ranges. Subsequent H1N1pdm isolates have HA
activation pH values ranging from 5.2–5.4, sug-
gesting pH 5.5 may be the upper limit for human
pandemic potential and a lower value may be
preferred. Indeed, a destabilizing HA mutation
in the background of H1N1pdm results in a loss-
of-function of airborne transmissibility in ferrets
and has been reported to be followed by re-
gain-of-function by mutations that lower the HA
activation pH to 5.3, a value representative of
human-adapted H1N1pdm viruses
(Russier et al., 2016). For the moment, it
appears that while HA pH of activation that is
shown experimentally to be suitable for human
infection is highly typical of isolates from human
pandemic and seasonal influenza (Table 3, bot-
tom right) (Galloway et al., 2013), it is possible
for humans to have symptomatic infection with
(though not extensively transmit) viruses with
activation pH closer to the range associated with
terrestrial birds (Table 3, bottom left). Con-
versely (Table 3, top right), there are avian H9,
H10, H14, and H15 isolates that display activa-
tion pH typical of human viruses
(Galloway et al., 2013). The existence of these
human-like avian viruses is perhaps unsurprising,
as they may lack other essential adaptations for
human transmission. As in the case of receptor
binding, reliance on this trait to prioritize
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pandemic prevention measures should consider
this property in conjunction with other proper-
ties associated with pandemic potential and will
likely enrich the coverage of truly high-risk
strains on average.
Systematic assessment of the predictive
value of HA activation pH will require broad
empirical testing, since nearly 100 residues
throughout the HA molecule have been impli-
cated in regulating HA pH of activation. Pre-
dicting activation pH from sequence will
therefore require more extensive data. To
address this issue, sequencing studies com-
bined with phenotypic assays could be per-
formed on a large range of HA variants to
determine the effects of pH-altering mutations
in different HA subtypes. High-resolution deter-
mination of HA structural intermediates may
assist in developing molecular modeling
approaches to calculate HA stability from
sequence. In the interim, there is a pressing
need to develop high-throughput assays for HA
pH of activation, along with other properties
believed important to interspecies adaptation,
in the thousands of surveillance samples
obtained annually.
Trait 3: Polymerase complex
efficiency
A. Definition of the trait
The heterotrimer of influenza polymerase subu-
nits (PA, PB1, PB2 gene products, together
forming the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase)
and the nucleoprotein (NP gene product) is
required to transcribe and replicate the viral
genome (Huang et al., 1990). The polymerase
genes of viruses isolated from avian hosts show
a number of genetic differences from their coun-
terparts in viruses isolated from humans
(Chen et al., 2006), and avian virus polymerase
typically performs inefficiently in replicating the
viral genome in human cells (Cauldwell et al.,
2014; Naffakh et al., 2008). Adaptation to effi-
cient human-to-human transmission requires effi-
cient activity of this complex of proteins, which
we refer to as the polymerase complex, in
human cells (Cauldwell et al., 2014;
Naffakh et al., 2008).
B. Genetic basis of polymerase complex
efficiency
Some mutations in PB2 are consistently associ-
ated with efficient function of the polymerase
complex in mammalian cells (Figure 2). As long
ago as 1977, it was shown that an avian influ-
enza virus could achieve efficient replication in
mammalian cells by acquiring mutations solely
in the PB2 subunit of the viral polymerase
(Spooner and Barry, 1977). The most famous
of these mutations was later described as PB2
residue 627 (Subbarao et al., 1993), which is a
glutamic acid (Glu) in avian influenza viruses but
a lysine (Lys) in human-adapted viruses, includ-
ing those that emerged in the pandemics of
1918, 1957 and 1968, and their seasonal
descendants. An important exception is the
virus that sparked the pandemic of 2009. In this
virus, the PB2 segment had been introduced
from an avian precursor into swine viruses in
the 1990s, and mammalian adaptation had
been achieved by a different set of PB2 muta-
tions including changes at residues at 271, 590
and 591 (Mehle and Doudna, 2009). Now that
the 3-dimensional structure of the viral polymer-
ase has been elucidated, we can see that resi-
due 627, 271, 590 and 591 lie on the same
external surface. Mammalian-adapting muta-
tions increase the positive charge of this
domain, suggesting that they either adapt the
virus for interaction with an enhancing host fac-
tor or enhance its ability to repel a restriction
factor (Mehle and Doudna, 2009). Recently a
host factor, ANP32A, that differs between
mammals and flighted birds was shown to be a
cofactor of the influenza polymerase, and the
species specific difference could explain the
inefficient function of avian virus polymerase
and the stringent selection for the 627Glu->Lys
adaptive mutation in mammals (Long et al.,
2016).
Another residue implicated in mammalian
adaptation of the polymerase is residue 701 of
PB2, which lies close to but is distinct from the
627 cluster. It has been suggested that this
mutation and others in this domain at residues
702 and 714 affect the interaction between PB2
and importin-alpha isoforms either in a way that
enhances nuclear import of newly synthesized
PB2 or that affects polymerase function once
inside the nucleus, the site of viral RNA replica-
tion (Resa-Infante et al., 2008; Gabriel et al.,
2005; Sediri et al., 2015). Other mutations have
been described that adapt PB2 for the mamma-
lian nucleus (for example the triplet threonines
at positions 147, 339 and 588) but whether they
affect interaction with ANP32A, importins or as
yet unidentified host factors is not yet
elucidated.
The adaptive value of these mutations is
shown by experimental or observational data in
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which a mammalian host is infected with a virus
whose PB2 is not adapted for efficient mamma-
lian replication, but such a mutation becomes
common in the virus population over the course
of infection. Such evolution has been observed
in a fatal human case of influenza A/H7N7
(Jonges et al., 2014) and in mouse experiments
following serial lung passage using an isolate
from this outbreak (de Jong et al., 2013). Lys at
position 627 has also been associated with
greater severity in zoonotic H7N9 (Sha et al.,
2016) and H5N1 (de Jong et al., 2006) cases
However, reverse genetics experiments show
that certain strains of avian influenza may be less
able to accept these mutations than others
(Long et al., 2013).
C. Experimental assays to measure
polymerase complex efficiency in human
cells
Polymerase complex efficiency in human cells
can be measured by an in situ assay in which the
influenza polymerase is reconstituted from
cloned cDNAs in plasmids and then coexpressed
with “minigenome,” a viral-like RNA encoding a
reporter, such as luciferase. By measuring the
rate of reporter accumulation in the transfected
human cell line, specific combinations of RNA
sequences for the polymerase-complex viral
genes can thereby be screened directly for their
efficiency in producing the mRNA encoding the
reporter gene product, providing a measure of
human adaptation of the polymerase complex
(Moncorge´ et al., 2010).
The original form of the in situ reconstituted
polymerase assay requires expression of just the
minimal set of four viral proteins to replicate the
minigenome RNA: PB1, PB2, PA and NP. How-
ever, recent work showed an important addi-
tional role for another protein, the nuclear
export protein (NEP), which is translated from a
spliced mRNA derived from RNA segment 8
(that also encodes the major interferon antago-
nist NS2) (Robb et al., 2009). In human H5N1
isolates that do not contain PB2 host-adapting
mutations, the inefficient activity of these avian
polymerases in human cells could also be com-
pensated for by certain mutations in NEP
(Ma¨nz et al., 2012). It appears that NEP is an
important regulator of the balance between
transcription and replication (Chua et al.,
2013Paterson and Fodor, 2012), and can thus
enhance fitness in viruses containing otherwise
inefficient polymerases. The mechanism of this is
as follows: the polymerase-enhancing domain of
NEP is masked when NEP is folded in one
conformation. However, mutations that increase
the ability of NEP to rescue avian polymerase
function allow more ready unfolding of the pro-
tein, unmasking the “activating” domain at the
lower temperature of the mammalian respiratory
tract. Interestingly, NEP overexpression in cells
in which human-adapted polymerase is reconsti-
tuted is inhibitory because excess complemen-
tary RNA accumulates at the expense of
messenger RNA and further viral RNA replica-
tion (Robb and Fodor, 2012). Thus although a
short-term adaptation of avian virus polymerase
to mammalian cells can be achieved in this way,
it may be that further compensatory changes
rebalance NEP function in the face of polymer-
ase adaptation during continued circulation in
humans, although direct evidence for this selec-
tion is lacking. Indeed, although the rescue of
low polymerase activity by NEP may explain the
human infections by H5N1 viruses that lack other
polymerase adaptations, it is not clear that such
rescue is sufficient to create a level of transmissi-
bility consistent with pandemic spread. None-
theless, this finding shows that the minimal
polymerase assay is not always sufficient to pre-
dict viruses that have functionally adapted poly-
merase activity to human cells and that a role for
other viral proteins including at least NEP should
also be considered in assessment of polymerase
function.
Alternatively, polymerase activity could be
measured in the context of viral infections
(although this will require proper containment).
This could be achieved by measuring intracellu-
lar levels of viral transcripts using transcriptomics
or qRT-PCR. Such experiments would provide
important information if they are performed
using appropriate cell lines (or respiratory
explants) at the temperature of the human air-
way (33˚C). It has been suggested that plaque
size at 33˚C can be used as a surrogate measure
of polymerase function but plaque size is a mut-
ligenic trait. The predictive value of such assays
for transmissibility is limited.
Ultimately, it would be valuable to develop a
simple screen to assess the ability of a viral poly-
merase to support replication and transmission
in humans. This phenotype is influenced by at
least 4 different viral genes and involves interac-
tions with several different human host factors. If
all the relevant host factors were enumerated,
one could imagine quickly converting sequence
information into an assay that tested for interac-
tions that should support activity. Along these
lines the recent description of a host factor,
ANP32A that differs between flighted birds and
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mammals and explains the poor activity of avian
polymerase in mammalian cells is a step forward
(Long et al., 2016).
D. Role of polymerase complex efficiency
in pandemic risk prediction
The inefficient polymerase of avian influenza
viruses in mammalian cells is one of the host-
range barriers that likely diminishes pandemic
risk. Unlike the requirement for adaptive muta-
tion in the novel HA, this polymerase barrier can
be rather readily overcome by reassortment in
which an avian virus with novel antigenicity can
acquire one or more polymerase genes from
mammalian-adapted viruses. In addition, adap-
tation of avian virus polymerase by accumulation
of adaptive mutations in either the polymerase
genes or possibly in other viral genes such as
the NS segment encoding NEP can enhance
avian virus polymerase function sufficiently to
support a host range jump.
Many H5N1 viruses that circulate today in the
avian reservoir already have mutations in PB2 at
627 (Long et al., 2013) or 701 (de Jong et al.,
2006), likely resulting from the reintroduction of
mammalian-adapted strains back into the wild
bird reservoir. These have been associated in
human infections with more severe cases
(de Jong et al., 2006). The fact that these
strains have not achieved sustained human-to-
human transmission demonstrates that while
polymerase adaptations to humans are likely
necessary, they are not sufficient for a strain to
spark a pandemic. Moreover, the absence of the
signature PB2 627K mutation in the 2009 H1N1
pandemic strain demonstrates the limitations of
relying on any single mutation for risk prediction
(Herfst et al., 2010); viruses with the avian-like
residue have also been isolated from zoonotic
human cases of H5N1, H7N9, and H9N2 infec-
tions (Table 4, bottom left). On the other hand,
the concept that adaptation of the polymerase is
necessary for sustained human transmission is
validated by findings that the 2009 pandemic
strain had adapted to replication in human cells
by changes other than E627K within the poly-
merase (Mehle and Doudna, 2009). Identifica-
tion of biophysical mechanisms common to
mammalian-adaptive mutations may in the
future provide the basis for new biological or
biophysical assays of polymerase function to
inform risk predictions.
In summary, no single polymerase mutation
appears to be predictive of pandemic risk for all
viruses, but the concept that the polymerase
must adapt to human cells before it can cause
extensive human-to-human transmission appears
consistent with the four pandemic jumps that
have occurred in modern times.
Discussion
There has been tremendous progress in under-
standing the traits involved in the adaptation of
avian influenza viruses for efficient human-to-
human transmission and the genetic and struc-
tural basis of each of these traits. While the abil-
ity to use virus sequence data to inform risk
assessment of pandemic potential is improving,
it remains essential to consider these data along-
side other experimental and epidemiological
data. For example, in 2013 there was a substan-
tial increase in the number of human infections
with A/H5N1 viruses in Cambodia. The increase
in infections was cause for substantial concern
by itself. Enhancing the level of concern was the
finding that some of the viruses collected from
infected humans contained previously identified
genetic mutations suggestive of human adapta-
tion (Davis et al., 2014). These findings led to
extensive epidemiological and experimental
investigations and then to the decision to pro-
duce a candidate vaccine virus from a virus rep-
resentative of the 2013 Cambodian outbreaks.
While predictions of virus phenotypes from
sequence data can be informative, they are not
infallible, for several reasons, notably the large
number of sites involved in determining such
traits (Raman et al., 2014; Russell, 2014;
Cauldwell et al., 2014; Mehle and Doudna,
2009; Ma¨nz et al., 2012; Herfst et al., 2010),
the important role of epistasis (dependence of a
mutation’s effect on the genetic background in
which it appears) in determining these traits
(Russell et al., 2014; Kryazhimskiy et al., 2011;
Gong and Bloom, 2014; Bloom et al., 2010;
Wu et al., 2016; Raman et al., 2014;
Tharakaraman et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2013),
and the consequent imperfections in our ability
to map single sequence polymorphisms to a trait
value. For example, the hallmark HA amino acid
residues 190, 226 and 228 are important to
human adaptation, but “human-adapting” muta-
tions at these residues do not always change
receptor-binding specificity; it depends on the
genetic background. Similarly, amino acid resi-
dues 627 and 701 of the PB2 protein are often
involved in human adaptation, but both carried
the “avian-adapted” residue in the 2009 H1N1
pandemic strain. When these changes were
introduced individually or together in the labora-
tory, the resulting polymerase showed greater
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activity in a minigenome assay, but replication
was unchanged or attenuated in vitro, in mice,
and in ferrets (Herfst et al., 2010; Jagger et al.,
2010). After the pandemic strain was identified
and its anomalous residues at these sites noted,
other sites within PB2 were identified and found
to be responsible for human adaptation
(Mehle and Doudna, 2009; Yamada et al.,
2010).
Based on the evidence to date, it seems clear
that all three of the traits considered in this
review, and possibly others in Table 1, must be
simultaneously present at least to some degree
for a strain to cause a pandemic. Yet with only a
few instances of pandemic strains emerging per
century, it should not be surprising that a new
pandemic strain would violate an apparent rule
of human adaptation that applied perfectly to
previous pandemic strains, as in the case of the
PB2 residues associated with human adaptation
in 2009, or as in the case of activation pH of HA
in early 2009 isolates (Russier et al., 2016),
which had a value outside the range previously
seen in human influenza viruses. It is unclear
whether the list of sites and phenotypic traits
associated with human adaptation is nearly com-
plete or will continue to grow as we experience
additional pandemics. At least for the traits of
receptor binding (Childs et al., 2009) (Table 2)
and acid stability (Russier et al., 2016) (Table 3),
full human adaptation may not be required to
initiate a pandemic in a virus that is otherwise
well-adapted for humans. Thus, whether or not
the list of traits required for pandemic is now
complete, our understanding of where the
threshold lies for being sufficiently human-
adapted continues to change.
There are three complementary approaches
to address these limitations: improving genetic
prediction of biological traits, improving assays
of these traits, and improving animal models of
human transmission; all approaches are currently
progressing in parallel (Holder et al., 2011;
Simon et al., 2011). The first approach aims to
further refine our understanding of sequence-to-
trait relationships by continued studies of
diverse, naturally or artificially produced muta-
tions and their effects on the traits of interest.
Such research could use all of the approaches
described above and higher-throughput assays
that could be developed with improved technol-
ogy, for example as described in Box 3. This will
include generating mutations not found in
known strains in nature to probe for those that
could be involved in human adaptation in the
future (Hanson et al., 2015; Thyagarajan and
Bloom, 2014). The goal would be to identify
classes of functionally equivalent substitutions,
sufficient individually or in defined combinations
to confer a trait of interest when introduced into
a defined, avian-adapted genetic background.
Use of in vitro approaches with noninfectious
viruses or viral components, or infectious viruses
containing surface proteins to which there was
already population-wide immunity would reduce
the possible biosafety and biosecurity risks of
such studies (Lipsitch and Inglesby, 2014).
The second approach is to develop and
improve the throughput and accuracy of bio-
chemical and cell-biological assays of these
traits, so that virus isolates can be characterized
phenotypically in a routine manner, reducing
reliance on sequence-based predictions. It
seems feasible to develop high-throughput ver-
sions of many of the assays described in this
review for each of the three traits discussed,
which could then be routinely run on surveillance
isolates to contribute to risk prediction. For
none of these three traits is there a single gold
standard assay, and different assays may provide
different estimates of risk.
The third approach is to improve animal mod-
els to more precisely study phenotypes that are
important for human adaptation, and to clarify
whether the notion of ’mammalian adaptation’ is
in fact a valid category. Ferrets are the closest
known model for human transmission (see
Box 4). Respiratory-droplet transmission studies
in ferrets, and potentially in other animal mod-
els, have shown a remarkably strong correlation
with human transmissibility of influenza A strains
(Buhnerkempe et al., 2015). While these assays
are not perfectly predictive, they may be the
most reliable way at present to assess the trans-
mission potential of a virus in human popula-
tions. Here a partial counterexample to their
overall strong predictive value is H7N9 avian
influenza isolates from human zoonotic cases.
These viruses transmit in ferrets, albeit less effi-
ciently than human seasonal strains, yet human-
to-human transmission has been extremely rare
in the hundreds of human zoonotic cases caused
by H7N9 (Buhnerkempe et al., 2015). A chal-
lenge is the expense and practical challenge of
using large enough numbers of ferrets
(Buhnerkempe et al., 2015; Belser et al., 2013;
Nishiura et al., 2013) to assess transmissibility;
this will remain a technique of limited through-
put for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the
value of ferret testing for risk assessment can be
enhanced in at least two ways: first, by standard-
izing the conditions for ferret transmission
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experiments, so these can be more confidently
compared between laboratories; and second, by
continuing to combine ferret studies with studies
of viral traits and sequence/structural studies to
further identify correlates of transmissibility in
ferrets.
While the biological properties of a virus cer-
tainly play a large role in determining the pan-
demic risk posed by a strain, it is possible that
even a virus perfectly adapted for human-to-
human transmission might fail to transmit exten-
sively, due to ecological factors, chance, or
both. Initiation of a pandemic requires not only
a well-adapted virus but ecological opportunity
to spill over into humans (perhaps multiple times
if the first introduction is not “successful”
[Mills et al., 2006]), as well as a human popula-
tion that is immunologically susceptible and suf-
ficiently connected to establish ongoing
transmission (Box 5). Additional complexity
arises from the fact that selection pressures for
within-host proliferation and competition may
diverge from those needed for efficient trans-
mission (Park et al., 2013). Genetic bottlenecks
at the time of transmission (Poon et al.,
2016; Varble et al., 2014; Zaraket et al., 2015)
may further enhance the role of chance, as a
highly adaptive variant arising in a host may not
get transmitted in a particular event. However,
selective bottlenecks, which have been observed
in experimental transmission of H5N1 and avian-
like H1N1 viruses in ferrets, could lower the bar-
rier to emergence of human-adapted viruses
(Moncla et al., 2016; Wilker et al., 2013). Both
ecological and host factors are considered in the
CDC’s IRAT (Trock et al., 2015).
Evolutionary factors also play a role in pan-
demic risk evaluations. Even with excellent sur-
veillance, we may never isolate exactly the virus
that is destined to cause a pandemic from an
animal reservoir or a zoonotic human case;
rather, we may isolate its evolutionary precursor.
Understanding the potential of a strain to pro-
duce pandemic-capable progeny is yet a further
scientific challenge. Perhaps the most startling
finding of the gain-of-transmissibility experi-
ments with H5N1 avian influenza viruses was
that so few mutations were required to convert
a strain circulating in birds to mammalian trans-
mission. This concern was reinforced by a finding
that many of these mutations, including combi-
nations of some of them, were already present
in strains isolated during surveillance
(Russell et al., 2012). The interpretation of the
latter finding, however, is complicated by the
problem of epistasis: the effect of these
mutations in the genetic background of field
strains may or may not be the same as in the
strain studied in the laboratory.
It seems clear that a pandemic risk assess-
ment informed by genetic sequence data is bet-
ter than one uninformed by such sequence data,
but the thought experiment of considering the
2009 swine-origin virus, had it been seen prior
to initiating the pandemic, shows that such
efforts may fail to identify the risk posed by
strains that subsequently cause a pandemic.
According to the knowledge at the time, early
human isolates of 2009 (and presumably their
swine precursors) would have had an HA inter-
mediate between human and avian adaptation
in terms of receptor binding. They had an activa-
tion pH outside the range previously seen in
human viruses and more typical of avian viruses.
Moreover, these viruses lacked the amino acid
residues then thought to confer human adapta-
tion for the polymerase complex. We must imag-
ine that had this strain been detected in swine
surveillance prior to the pandemic emergence,
genetic as well as phenotypic considerations
would have marked it as low risk, creating a
false-negative risk assessment. Given that this
virus did in fact create a pandemic, it is evident
that failure of a nonhuman influenza virus to fully
meet the three criteria discussed in this review
does not disqualify it from posing a significant
risk of a pandemic.
Whether false positive predictions of high
pandemic risk are also possible is more difficult
to determine, because even a strain that is truly
high risk may fail to cause a pandemic for any
number of reasons; thus it is challenging to
prove that an assessment of high risk for a par-
ticular strain was erroneous. From a decision-
making perspective, a false positive is perhaps
less worrisome than a false negative, as a false
positive may motivate expenditure on preven-
tion measures directed at a strain that would not
have caused a pandemic, while a false negative
may lead to a failure to respond to a strain that
would.
As we seek to improve our understanding of
genetic and phenotypic bases of efficient human
transmission of influenza viruses, there are multi-
ple possible approaches. One approach that has
received considerable attention recently is to
perform gain-of-transmissibility studies in highly
pathogenic avian viruses; this has been contro-
versial because of concerns about the unusual
biosafety and biosecurity risks entailed in such
studies (for contrasting perspectives on these
risks, see the exchange in 2014–5 between
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Lipsitch and Inglesby, and Fouchier
[Lipsitch and Inglesby, 2014,
2015; Fouchier, 2015]).
There are alternative approaches to ferret
gain-of-transmission experiments in highly path-
ogenic avian influenza viruses, though disagree-
ment remains about the level of evidence such
alternatives provide. One alternative is to per-
form similar experiments starting from avian
viruses that are not highly pathogenic in mam-
mals, and/or are related to currently circulating
human seasonal viruses, so that immunity would
already be present in the population. Such
experiments can provide the same degree of
causal rigor as gain-of-function in highly patho-
genic avian viruses with novel surface antigens
and can elucidate general principles of mamma-
lian adaptation, but they cannot confirm that the
same changes would be observed in other
strains that are not used in the experiment. A
recent report shows a related way forward: the
recreation of the steps of mammalian adaptation
using viruses whose HA and NA are already cir-
culating in humans (Lakdawala et al., 2015).
Such loss+gain-of-transmissibility experiments
reconstruct the properties of naturally occurring
seasonal human strains, from laboratory-gener-
ated, avian-adapted (or at least human-dead-
apted) precursors. Reconstructing such seasonal
strains should pose a risk similar to that of work-
ing with the seasonal strains themselves, less
than that of a novel subtype. A 2011 report
employed a similar strategy, demonstrating the
importance of HA activation pH in mouse adap-
tation by selection experiments on a live attenu-
ated H5N1 vaccine strain lacking the NS1 gene
(Krenn et al., 2011). More recently, a 2009
H1N1 pandemic virus was modified to express a
mutation that increased pH of HA activation,
then selected in ferrets for droplet transmission,
and it was found that a second site mutation
partially restored the lower pH of activation of
the selected virus (Russier et al., 2016). One
limitation of de-adaptation strategies is that the
acquisition of transmissibility is perhaps most
likely to evolve by reversion of the de-adaptation
changes. As with all gain-of-function and loss-of-
function studies, epistatic effects of other loci in
the genetic background of the viruses used in
such studies set limits to the generalizability of
such experiments. Another kind of alternative is
simple characterization of ferret transmissibility
of naturally occurring highly pathogenic strains
without selection for airborne transmission. This
approach can provide correlative evidence for
the importance of genetic differences but
cannot prove the mechanistic role of any particu-
lar change.
Even if strain-based assessment methods
were much better, surveillance would be a key
rate-limiting step for pandemic risk assessment
to direct countermeasure development. If a
virus about to cause a pandemic is not found in
surveillance it cannot be assessed. The fact that
we have yet to identify a pandemic strain in
nonhuman hosts or in human spillover cases
before the pandemic starts indicates there is
much work to be done. Although surveillance
has expanded since the 2009 pandemic, it has
not been designed to optimize the chances of
detecting a pandemic strain before it becomes
pandemic; indeed, how to do so is not clear at
present. Some possible considerations would
be to maximize the diversity of isolates col-
lected, to preferentially sample strains that are
known to cause human infections, and to feed
back information from risk assessments to
inform choice of sampling. Rapid sequencing
and phenotypic characterization of strains and
dissemination of this information, along with
interpretations of the risk profiles implied, is
also important to maximizing the value of sur-
veillance. Further thought should be given to
the possibility of using high-throughput
sequencing as a screen for which viruses should
be subjected to phenotypic testing, which for
the moment is typically more costly, slower, and
lower-throughput than sequencing. More delib-
erate approaches to the design of surveillance
systems would also depend on answering the
question addressed in Box 2: how different
must a virus be from previously characterized
viruses to merit separate evaluation of its pan-
demic risk? The uncertainties noted above
about the phenotypic characteristics of viruses
isolated from previous pandemics (which may
have been present in the primary isolate or may
have arisen during egg passage in the labora-
tory) underline the need for careful attention to
passage histories of surveillance isolates to
avoid altering their genotype and phenotype
post-isolation (Bush et al., 2000). Expanding
and rationalizing surveillance in this way would
require overcoming political, logistical and
financial constraints that vary between countries
and regions.
Even with all of the foregoing suggestions in
place, it may be improbable that we can reliably
identify the ’needle in the haystack’ that is the
next pandemic influenza strain. Ultimately, the
goal is not risk assessment for its own sake, but
preparedness and early response to pandemic
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threats. In other areas where security is at stake,
it has been argued that making and improving
predictions should be accompanied by a sys-
tematic effort to design responses that will not
fail even if the predictions are wrong (Dan-
zig, 2011). In the influenza context, the value of
some countermeasures is strongly reliant on our
ability to identify truly high-risk prepandemic
threats: notably, preparation of seed vaccine
stocks for candidate pandemic strains, stockpil-
ing of subtype-specific vaccines, and culling of
poultry infected with such strains. Other types
of countermeasures, ranging from strengthening
local public health departments to stockpiling
antivirals or ventilators to developing faster pro-
cesses for vaccine manufacture to universal vac-
cines that should be effective against any
influenza A strain, should provide benefits
whether or not we have advance notice of the
strain causing the next pandemic. A comprehen-
sive assessment of priorities to prevent or miti-
gate the next influenza pandemic should
consider the balance between improving our
risk assessment capacity and developing
responses robust to the possibility that we will
once again be caught by surprise.
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